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CUTTING OFF THE UMBILICAL CORD –
REFLECTIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY TO SEVER THE
PARENTAL BOND
Tali Marcus(
Parenthood is a status comprising exclusivity relating to the
rights and responsibilities concerning the child. The rights and
obligations imbued in the parental status are evident first and
foremost during the child’s minority. #onetheless, the status has
legal meaning and implications that e(tend beyond the child’s
minority and carry on throughout adulthood. By defining
parenthood and assigning parental status, the law establishes legal
as well as social responsibility towards the child and a bond for
life. This article questions the eternal aspect of parenthood and
aspires to initiate discussion pertaining to the social and legal
conventions that pose parenthood as a binding legal relation and
responsibility for life. Today, the law permits the elimination of the
parental legal bond in cases of adoption. However, the law is
unable to cope with parental void and thus has trouble dealing
with relinquishing the parental status in instances that do not
involve adoption. This Article’s main concern are these instances.
The social-legal principles of the parental bond that are taken for
granted are re-examined and a new approach for abrogating the
parental bond is offered.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between a parent and a child is vital and
prominent to both parties. From the child’s perspective, the
( Ph.D. from The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would
like to thank Barak Medina, Zvi Triger, Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui, the participants
of the Faculty Seminar at Sapir College School of Law and the members of the
editorial board of the JLP for their insightful comments and suggestions.
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parental relationship supports his proper development and
contributes to his education, financial support, and physical and
emotional wellbeing. For the parent, parenthood is a path to self-
fulfillment. Parenthood enables one “to learn [about
oneself], . . . develop [oneself] as a person, and [attain]
satisfaction” through which one thrives.1 However, sometimes the
relationship does not fulfill this purpose.
Parenthood is a status comprising exclusive rights and
responsibilities concerning the child.2 The rights and obligations
imbued in the parental status are evident, first and foremost, when
the child is a minor. Nonetheless, the status has legal meaning and
implications that extend beyond the child’s minority and carry on
throughout adulthood.3 The legal system intends the parent-child
status to be permanent4 and eternal.5 By defining parenthood and
assigning parental status, the law establishes legal as well as social
responsibility and a bond for life. The question thus arises––what
are the justifications for, and implications of, establishing a bond
for life?
1 Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Parent’s Rights and the Value of Family,
117 ETHICS 80, 91–95 (2006).
2 Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 879, 883 (1984) [hereinafter Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status].
3 Margaret M. Mahoney, Permanence and Parenthood: The Case for
Abolishing the Adoption Annulment Doctrine, 42 IND. L. REV. 639, 639 (2009).
For a thorough development of the idea, see infra Part III.
4 SeeMahoney, supra note 3, at 639–640.
5 See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Census Records, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, www.archives.gov/research/census (last updated Feb. 1, 2017)
(showing that Census Records maintains records of citizens who are considered
relatives and it provides details of family members since the first Federal
Population Census that was taken in 1790) [hereinafter U.S. Nat’l Archives &
Records Admin., Census Records]; U.S. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.,
Researching an Individual or Family, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/research/native-americans/research-individual (last
updated Jan. 9, 2017) (showing that vital records such as birth certificates are
also saved as records by the states and territories. Those records are saved for
eternal use; Inheritance Laws employ the personal status in order to allocate a
person’s possessions after death). See infra Section II.B.
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Today, the law permits the elimination of the parental legal
bond in cases of adoption.6 The law usually consents to such
matters in instances where all known parents forfeit their parental
rights and responsibilities and surrender the child for adoption.7
However, when only one parent wishes to relinquish parental
status, the law will not allow it unless another person takes his or
her place.8 The law is unable to cope with parental void, and thus
has trouble dealing with relinquishing the parental status in
instances that do not involve adoption. A person cannot be
regarded parentless in the eyes of the law, even during adulthood.
My point of departure will be the fact that a person is defined
by law as a parent. The Article will not discuss the questions
concerning who the law should recognize as a parent, nor the
different possible definitions of parenthood. Rather, this Article
challenges the social and legal conventions that pose parenthood as
a binding legal relationship and responsibility for life and calls to
reconsider the parent-child relationship as an everlasting one.
This Article is not arguing for the abolishment of the institution
of parenthood altogether, nor is this Article contending that the
relationship should end automatically once a child reaches
adulthood. Rather, this Article argues that since filial relationships
are such a vital part of a person’s life—the institution of
parenthood in particular having a key role in shaping one’s
identity—one should have a choice to opt out of a relationship that
does not fulfill its purpose. This option should be made possible
only under certain circumstances and under the supervision of the
courts. The procedure should be tailor-made to these cases and be
part of the law governing the definition of parenthood.
6 SeeMahoney, supra note 3, at 640.
7 See Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights:
The Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend to Disaggregate
Family Status from Family Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 127, 154, 154 n. 125
(2010).
8 Id. at 154 n.125 (stating that a person “cannot effectively relinquish his
parental [status] . . . unless the other parent relinquishes it [as well] . . . [E]ven
[when] both parents want to relinquish their parental [status],” once the child is
old enough, “it is highly unlikely [that] the state would accept their
relinquishment.”).
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This Article’s contribution to the existing scholarship is three-
fold. First, reexamining social-legal principles governing the
parent-child relationship that are so obvious and taken for granted
that we do not pause to think about their relevance and rationale, is
important and significant in itself. Second, the Article’s critical
discussion of the eternal aspect of parenthood offers a novel point
of view of the parental bond and challenges the social and legal
conventions on this matter. Third, this Article offers a new
approach for abrogating the parental bond.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I describes briefly the
parental status and the exclusive rights and responsibilities
ascribed to it. Part II examines the legal, social, and symbolic
implications of the parent-child status throughout the child’s
adulthood. Part III discusses the legal options that currently exist to
abrogate the parental status. Those options include involuntary
termination of the parental status by state intervention and
abrogation of the status by choice. Furthermore, this Part will
discuss the doctrine of child emancipation, which is an
intermediate solution as it does not sever the parent-child status,
but still diminishes and restricts the parental control over their
child’s life by granting the child legal autonomy.9 Finally, Part IV
considers the case for “cutting off the umbilical cord.” This Part
suggests an alternative to the existing law which would extend the
instances in which the parental bond could be severed. Yet, it does
so in a very moderate and restrained way which accounts for
concerns that might be raised in opposition to this proposal. This
Article does not suggest to annul the parental status altogether
when the child reaches adulthood; it merely wishes to raise
awareness of the need to facilitate the termination of the parental
bond in some instances and recommends that the law should
provide means to enable people to do so.
9 Barbara Goldberg, “Cutting the Parental Ties”: Emancipation and Child
Support in California, 4 J. JUV. L. 187, 188 (1980); Carol Sanger & Eleanor
Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 239, 258–60 (1992).
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I. THE PARENTAL STATUS–EXCLUSIVITY, PERMANENCE, RIGHTS
ANDRESPONSIBILITIES
Parenthood is a status that confers rights and responsibilities
regarding the child. Parental rights include, among others, the right
to custody of the child, to discipline the child, to make decisions
regarding the upbringing of the child, and to decide where the child
shall live.10 Parental obligations include, among other things, the
responsibility to support and to care for the child.11 The Supreme
Court of the United States has recognized “the interests of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children,” as a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Constitution.12
Parenthood has two key elements: exclusivity and permanence.
Generally, parenthood is considered an exclusive status.13 The law
recognizes one set of parents for a child at any given time and
these parents are granted exclusive parental rights and duties.14
Through the rule of exclusivity, the law creates a stark dichotomy
between “parents” and “nonparents,” who are considered
“strangers” by the law.15 Only the child’s legal parents can claim
rights with respect to the child.16 The exclusivity principle also
10 Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As An Exclusive Status, supra note 2, at
884–85 (listing various rights a parent has over the child).
11 Id. at 885.
12 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
13 Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As An Exclusive Status, supra note 2, at
879; Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to a
Relational Right, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2009); Matthew M.
Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based
Standard, 16 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 83, 88–89 (2004); Alison Harvison Young,
Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6
AM. U. J. GENDER&L. 505, 506 (1998).
14 Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status, supra note 2, at
879; Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
309, 314 (2007) [hereinafter Jacobs, Why Just Two?].
15 Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 5; Jacobs, Why Just Two?, supra note
14, at 314; Kavanagh, supra note 13, at 88–89; Young, supra note 13, at 520.
16 Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status, supra note 2, at
883; Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 5.
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shields parents from the state or third parties intervening in their
parenting decisions.17
The legal system intends the parent-child status to be
permanent18 and eternal, lasting from birth until death and even
beyond.19 Family laws reflect the view that “the stability that
results from the maintenance of existing family ties&[is important
to] children, their families, and society as a whole.”20 This Article
initiates a much-needed discussion pertaining to the permanence
aspect of parenthood.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARENT-CHILD STATUS
This Part will discuss the legal and symbolic implications of
the parent-child status. The emphasis will be on the implications
the relationship has when the child is adult. The part will also
discuss, to a lesser extent, the implications of the relationship that
are relevant during the child’s minority, yet only those implications
that go beyond the parental rights and responsibilities that are
described in the previous part and that are usually associated with
parenthood.
A. Symbolic
The law has an expressive function.21 It conveys messages and
makes statements that are important and valuable in and of
themselves. Those messages shape the culture and affect “our
17 Blecher-Prigat, supra note 13, at 5–6; Jacobs, Why Just Two?, supra note
14, at 311; Young, supra note 13, at 524.
18 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 639–40.
19 Id.; see sources cited supra note 5. By allowing (and sometimes
compelling) the distribution of property between parents and their children
through inheritance, Inheritance law, in effect, preserves the relationship after
death.
20 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 643.
21 Cass R. Sunstein, On The Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2022, 2026, 2051 (1996); Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive
Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 991–94 (1989).
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perception of ourselves and of our relationship with others.”22 The
interaction between law and culture is a symbiotic one, where one
is both dependent on and influences the other. Law shapes
identities, social practices and attitudes, and the meaning of
cultural symbols. Yet, law is also a product of society and is
shaped by the culture in which it thrives.23
The parent-child bond is a cultural-social bond as well as a
legal one. The meaning of the relationship and its scope have
changed throughout the years,24 differing from country to country
and across societies.25 The fact that a person is legally considered
someone’s parent has personal and social significance that exceeds
the one established by law. The parental status and the parent-child
bond as defined by law, have a meaning even when no other
content is ascribed to them—even when parenthood is stripped of
the rights, responsibilities and obligations that are usually
attributed to it. The status granted by the law symbolizes a
relationship cherished by society, and affects personal identity as
well as the way we perceive relationships with others. The parent
“title” or “label” has value in and of itself because it signifies a
social institution that comes with a bundle of cultural connotations.
Because the term “parent” denotes a social institution, it
significantly affects the way the parent and the child come to see
themselves and the way society sees them.
The law’s expressive function can be illustrated through the
struggle for same-sex marriage. When Vermont introduced its
Civil Union Statute, it was the first state to confer all the state-
created rights and responsibilities of marriage to same-sex
couples.26 Same-sex couples who entered into civil unions would
22 Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 293
(1988).
23 Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 35, 46–47
(2001).
24 Zvi Triger, Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for
Critical Family Law, 13 THEO. INQ. L. 361, 364–65 (2012) (stating that “the
family has been constantly changing and evolving throughout human history.”).
25 Nicole L. Sault, Many Mothers, Many Fathers: The Meaning of
Parenthood Around the World, 36 SANTACLARA L. REV. 395, 395, 397 (1996).
26 Vincent J. Samar, Privacy and the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage
Versus Unions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 783, 784 (2005).
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get all the state created benefits of marriage.27 The only difference
was withholding the title “marriage.”28 Proponents of same-sex
marriage have objected to the civil union alternative, arguing that
withholding the term “marriage” has a substantial meaning.29 They
argued that civil unions are a “separate but equal” substitute for
marriage and as such do not grant full equality.30 Furthermore,
denying same-sex couples the right to marry while giving them the
same legal rights associated with marriage marks them as inferior
and second-class citizens,31 since civil unions do not carry the
same social meaning as marriage.32 “Treating [civil unions and
marriage] as if they were the same overlooks [the] ways that
culture shapes self-esteem, [] individual identit[y],” and the
construction of relationships.33 “Marriage” carries with it “a sense
of belonging, . . . of being a part of a community,”34 societal
legitimacy, and recognition.35 The choice of name is important
“when the law does the labeling.”36
Abrogating the parental status, thus annulling the parent-child
bond, has an expressive value. Abrogating the status is a statement
27 The couple could get only state created benefits and only if they were
residents of Vermont. Civil unions do not confer the many benefits in the private
sector that are available only to married couple. Misha Isaak, “What’s in a
Name?”: Civil Unions and the Constitutional Significance of “Marriage,” 10 U.
PA. CONST. L. 607, 626 (2008).
28 Id. at 608; Samar, supra note 26, at 784.
29 See Isaak, supra note 27, at 610; Samar, supra note 26, at 793.
30 Isaak, supra note 27, at 609.
31 Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil
Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV.
113, 135 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class
Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1275, 1311
(2011); Michael Mello, For Today, I’m Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-
Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 156 (2000).
32 Samar, supra note 26, at 785.
33 Id. at 785.
34 Mello, supra note 31, at 252 (quoting Jack Hoffman, Partnership and
Marriage Wouldn’t Ever Be the Same, RUTLANDHERALD (Jan. 16, 2000)).
35 Sheila Rose Foster, The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of
Symbolism: Some Thoughts on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 319, 321 (1998); Samar, supra note 26, at 793.
36 Mello, supra note 31, at 257.
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made by law, a message the law communicates to the broader
society about when relationships should stop being recognized as
parental. It is a symbolic statement that helps the former parent and
the former child define and construct their identities. It affects their
perceptions of themselves and the perception of their relationships
with others. Take for example a parent who sexually abused or
assaulted their child. Even if the abusive parent’s rights were
terminated and there was no contact between the parent and the
victim child, the parental status remains—the abuser is still
considered the child’s parent. In this kind of scenario, the parental
title has great legal and social significance. It is reasonable to think
that the child would want to abrogate the parent-child bond
because the status in and of itself is a symbol that carries great
meaning and value. By abrogating the parental status, the law
conveys a message regarding certain kinds of behavior that are
prohibited in a specific society. Revoking the parental status in
such cases can also have a therapeutic effect for the child.37
B. Inheritance
The parent-child bond has significant legal implications in
addition to the symbolic and social ones. Succession is a
substantial legal aspect affected by the parental bond, persisting
throughout the child’s life and still relevant in adulthood. The
37 For discussion about “Therapeutic Jurisprudence” see generally, Susan
Daicoff, Apology, Forgiveness, Reconciliation & Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 13
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 131, 134, 153 (2013) (describing “therapeutic
jurisprudence” as a development in law “which seeks to make the law a healing
profession by exploring its potential to heal individuals, relationships, and
society.”); Patricia Monroe Wisnom, Probate Law and Mediation: A
Therapeutic Perspective, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1345, 1352–53 (1995) (defining
“therapeutic jurisprudence” as the study of law that incorporates mental health,
psychology and related areas to improve the outcomes of law and increase
therapeutic consequences); David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An
Overview, 17 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 125, 125 (2000) (defining “therapeutic
jurisprudence” as “the study of the role of law as a therapeutic agent, [that]
focuses on the law’s impact on emotional life and on psychological well-
being”); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24
TOURO L. REV. 17, 20 (2008) (exploring the therapeutic jurisprudence
developments).
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parent-child status has a significant impact on inheritance law on
several levels.
Inheritance law is governed by two devices that facilitate the
distribution of the decedent’s estate% the option to execute a will,
and intestate succession.38 When choosing to write a will, a person
is using her freedom of testation to decide who her heirs would be
and to allocate her property among them the way she sees fit.39
Freedom of testation is not absolute, however, and is restricted by
formalities concerning the manner in which the will should be
administered, as well as by other doctrines.40 When a person dies
intestate, meaning without leaving a valid will, their property is
distributed according to legal provisions adopted through state
law.41 Intestate laws set default rules for the allocation of property
at death, which try to imitate the reasonable person’s choice for
bequeathing the estate.42
The default rules of intestate law usually consider family
members to be the preferred beneficiary of the decedent’s
estate43—typically spouses, children, and parents.44 When a person
38 Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Mandatory Nature of Inheritance, 53 AM. J.
JURIS. 105, 105 (2008).
39 Ray D. Madoff, A Tale of Two Countries: Comparing the Law of
Inheritance in Two Seemingly Opposite Systems, 37 B.C. INT’L&COMP. L. REV.
333, 334 (2014).
40 Id. at 333, 334, 345–46; Margaret Ryznar & Angelique Devaux, Au
Revoir, Will Contests: Comparative Lessons for Preventing Will Contests, 14
NEV. L. J. 1, 1, 9 (2013).
41 Terin Barbas Cremer, Reforming Intestate Inheritance for Stepchildren
and Stepparents, 18 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 89, 91 (2011); Kreiczer-Levy,
supra note 38, at 105; Matthew Boehringer, Intestate Succession for Indigent
Parents: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 121, 122, 137
(2013).
42 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 139; Cremer, supra note 41, at 91; Susan
N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal for Guided Discretion in
Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 787, 789 (2012); Mark Glover, Rethinking
the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 91 (2014); Kreiczer-
Levy, supra note 38, at 105; Jennifer Seidman, Functional Families and
Dysfunctional Law: Committed Partners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO.
L. REV. 211, 211 (2004).
43 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 122; Cremer, supra note 41, at 91–92;
Gary, supra note 42, at 787; Glover, supra note 42, at 91; Madoff, supra note
39, at 344.
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dies intestate her estate usually passes to her descendants, even if
she would have wanted otherwise.45 If the deceased does not have
children, the estate could go to her ascendants.46 Research shows
that a large percentage of people in the United States die without
writing a will.47 There could be various reasons for that, such as
the fact that people are reluctant to confront their death. No matter
the reason, this fact highlights the crucial role that the parent-child
bond plays in the allocation of property through inheritance.
There are some limitations on an individual’s testation power
when they decide to write a will. In most of the western world and
in other countries as well, a person cannot completely disinherit
certain family members specified by law. In civil law countries, a
decedent’s family members may be entitled to a forced share of the
decedent’s estate.48 The “forced share,” sometimes referred to as
the “reserve share” or “legitim,” is a portion of the decedent’s
estate that the specified family members are entitled to and which
the decedent cannot freely distribute.49 The decedent can freely
44 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 122, 137–38; Cremer, supra note 41, at
91–92.
45 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 122, 137–38; Cremer, supra note 41, at
91–92; Gary, supra note 42, at 791; Seidman, supra note 42, at 223.
46 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 122, 137–38.
47 Id. at 137; Madoff, supra note 39, at 344.
48 Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 83, 117 (1994); Madoff, supra note 39 at 334, 342–43 (stating that
under French law, the children are entitled to a reserved share of the estate, and
an individual can only distribute the remaining portion); Ryznar & Devaux,
supra note 40, at 9 (stating that under French law children are entitled to forced
share); Ian Sumner & Caroline Forder, Proposed Revisions of Matrimonial
Property Law, a New Inheritance Law and the First Translation of the Dutch
Civil Code, Book 1 (Family Law) Into English, 2004 INT’L SURV. FAM. L. 337,
366 (2004) (discussing forced heirship in the Netherlands); Ryan McLearen,
International Forced Heirship: Concerns and Issues with European Forced
Heirship Claims, 3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L. J. 323, 327 (2011) (stating that
in Germany and Italy both children and ascendants are entitled to forced share).
49 Aaron Schwabach, Of Charities and Clawbacks: The European Union
Proposal on Successions and Wills as a Threat to Charitable Giving, 17
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 447, 452 (2011); see Brashier, supra note 48, at 117, 120;
Madoff, supra note 39, at 334, 336–37, 342; Sumner & Forder, supra note 48, at
366; McLearen, supra note 48, at 325–26.
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allocate the remaining portion of the estate.50 Civil law countries
differ on the size of the portion of forced inheritance, the approach
to calculating the size of the estate, and the specific family
members that are entitled to the legitim.51 Nonetheless, they have
in common the recognition of the children of the decedent as
entitled to a forced share.52 Some countries also recognize the
decedent’s parents as entitled to a forced share, usually when the
decedent does not have children.53
50 Brashier, supra note 48, at 117, 120; Madoff, supra note 39, at 334, 336–
37, 342; McLearen, supra note 48, at 325–26.
51 See Brashier, supra note 48, at 117 (stating that under French law the
children are entitled to a reserved share, but the French testator is free to
disinherit the surviving spouse); see also Schwabach, supra note 49 (describing
the difference in the application of forced share doctrine across a range of
European countries); McLearen, supra note 48, at 327 (stating that under
German law, unlike French law, forced heirship are only applicable to “first
degree” descendants, thus limiting the reserve portion of the estate to the
surviving spouse and to the decedent’s children only. Under Italian law children
of the testator, the surviving spouse and ascendants (when there are no children
alive at the time of testator’s death) are entitled to a forced portion of the estate.
The children can be legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted). Id; Nikolaos Vervessos
& Triantafyllos Stavrakidis, Company Law and the Law of Succession in
Greece, 67 RHDI 567, 572, 648–649 (2014) (stating that under Greek law only
legitimate children (including adopted children) are entitled to a forced share of
the estate; the addition of all compulsory shares shall amount to one-half of the
estate; the right to a forced share is accorded to the descendants and to the
parents of the deceased as well as to the surviving spouse).
52 Brashier, supra note 48, at 117 (stating that “the French system of testate
succession . . . ensures protection for the children of a testator by recognizing
the legitime, or portion of the parent’s estate of which a child cannot be
disinherit without cause.”); Madoff, supra note 39, at 334, 343 (stating that
under French law, the children are entitled to a reserved share of the estate); see
also Schwabach, supra note 49, at 451 (stating that in most of the countries of
the European Union, forced heirship laws protect children whose parents have
left them less than their legally determined share); McLearen, supra note 48, at
327 (stating that under German and Italian law children of the testator are
entitled to a forced portion of the estate).
53 Schwabach, supra note 49, at 454–55, 457, 461 (stating that in Austria,
in absence of issue, the ancestors may claim a share; In Belgium, in absence of
issue the testator’s parents are entitled to forced share, but not other ancestors; In
Germany, in absence of descendants and spouse, parents are entitled to forced
share; In the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, in the absence of an issue,
the ancestors are entitled to a forced share); Vervessos & Stavrakidis, supra note
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Common law countries usually reject the doctrine of forced
share.54 Yet, some of those countries have devised other limitations
on the ability to disinherit family members as well as other
dependents.55 Common law countries, such as England, New
Zealand, Australia, and some Canadian provinces, have devised
ways to provide greater protection for family members by enacting
family maintenance statutes,56 which allow “family members and
other dependents [of the decedent] to petition the court to receive
more than was [afforded to] them under the . . . will.”57 These
statutes grant discretion to the courts to make provisions for the
maintenance of certain people from the decedent’s estate, even if
the decedent has omitted them from the will.58
In the United States, the laws of inheritance are administered
by the states.59 Over half of Americans die intestate, leaving their
estate to be distributed according to the law of the state.60
Accordingly, the estate would usually go to their children (or other
descendants) and spouse, and in some cases to their parents (or
other ascendants).61 In this way, the parent-child bond influences
the posthumous distribution of property in a large number of cases.
51, at 649 (stating that under Greek law the parents of the deceased are entitled
to a forced share); McLearen, supra note 48, at 327 (stating that under Italian
law ascendants of the testator are entitled to a forced portion of the estate, when
there are no children alive at the time of testator’s death).
54 McLearen, supra note 48, at 323–24.
55 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARZ. L. REV.
235, 270–71 (1996); Brashier, supra note 48, at 123; Kreiczer-Levy, supra note
38, at 117; Madoff, supra note 39, at 336.
56 Brashier, supra note 48, at 123 (stating that in England a decedent’s
spouse or children may file a claim against the estate if the will does not provide
the survivor with a reasonable “financial provision”); Madoff, supra note 39, at
336.
57 Madoff, supra note 39, at 336; Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 38, at 117.
58 Brashier, supra note 48, at 123; Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 38, at 117;
Leslie, supra note 55, at 270; Madoff, supra note 39, at 336–37.
59 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 122; Cremer, supra note 41, at 91; Gary,
supra note 42, at 787; Glover, supra note 42, at 91; Kreiczer-Levy, supra note
38, at 105; Madoff, supra note 39, at 336.
60 Madoff, supra note 39, at 344.
61 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 122, 137–38; Cremer, supra note 41, at
91–92; Gary, supra note 42, at 787; Glover, supra note 42, at 91; Madoff, supra
note 39, at 344.
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A person can choose to execute a will as a way to allocate her
property after her death. In the United States, the doctrine of
“freedom of testation” is the governing law of inheritance.62 An
individual’s right to distribute their property the way they see fit
receives great emphasis. At first glance, the freedom of testation
seems comprehensive and conclusive. Yet, despite rhetoric
supporting freedom of testation, a closer look at the laws of
inheritance and at the way courts implement them reveals that
there is misconception regarding the scope of testamentary
freedom and the effect it actually has on the distribution of
decedents’ assets.
Pretermitted heir statues provide a decedent’s surviving child a
share of the estate in situations in which the writing of the will
62 Madoff, supra note 39, at 335–36. It is interesting to note that Louisiana
is the only state that has civil law tradition, and which continues to hold civil
law principles, especially in the field of family law. See Neely S. Griffith, When
Civilian Principles Clash with the Federal Law: An Examination of the
Interplay Between Louisiana’s Family Law and Federal Statutory and
Constitutional Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 519, 520 (2001). Thus, Louisiana is the
only state with forced inheritance (forty-nine of the fifty states (Georgia being
the exception) and the District of Columbia limit the freedom of testation for
protecting the surviving spouse. This goal is achieved using the elective share
doctrine. See Terry L. Turnipseed, Community Property v. The Elective Share,
72 LA. L. REV. 161, 162 (2011). The elective share might be considered a form
of forced inheritance. The elective share gives the surviving spouse a choice (an
election) either “to take [the]property left [for her] under the will or . . . take the
amount specified by the elective [] law instead. Id. at 170. The elective share is
usually a “fixed fractional portion of the value of the [decedent’s estate.]”
Brashier, supra note 48, at 101. In the past, Louisiana’s laws have protected all
children from disinheritance by their parents. Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the
Child From Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 1–
2 (1996). Today, however, the law in Louisiana limits the group of forced heirs
to include only children twenty-three years old or younger, or children of any
age unable to take care of themselves because of mental incapacity or physical
infirmity. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1493(a). The forced heir cannot be
deprived of their share in the decedent estate, except in certain circumstances
specified by the law. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1494. The reasons for
disinheritance are specified in LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1620–1621, and only
when the reason is explicitly expressed in the will. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN.
arts. 1624.
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preceded the birth of the child.63 The rationale underpinning these
statutes is the belief that parents want to bequeath their property to
their children.64 The assumption is that disinheritance was not
intentional and only took place since the will was written before
the child was born and the testator either forgot or did not have the
time to update it.65
Wills can be contested using formalities, and doctrines such as
mental capacity, undue influence, fraud, and public policy.66 When
testators disinherit family members, courts often use these
formalities and doctrines to invalidate the will.67 Despite the
rhetoric reinforcing the principle of freedom of testation, courts
aspire to ensure that testators leave an adequate portion of the
estate to their next of kin.68 Thus, freedom of testation is, in fact,
restricted in cases where the testator deviates from what the courts
regard as prevailing moral standards—allocating property to the
testator’s family.
63 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (1969) (amended 2010). Section 2-302 of
the Uniform Probate Code deals with “omitted children.” Id. The section states
that if a testator fails to provide in her will for any of her children born or
adopted after the execution of the will, the omitted after-born or after-adopted
child receives a share in the estate as specified in the code. Id. However, the
child would not receive a share, if it appears from the will that the omission was
intentional or if the testator provided for that child by transfer outside the will
and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by
the testator’s statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of the transfer
or other evidence. Id.; Glover, supra note 42, at 92–93.
64 This rationale could be deduced from the default rules set by intestate
laws which try to imitate the reasonable person’s choice for bequeathing the
estate. These laws consider children of the decedent to be heirs. See Cremer,
supra note 41, at 91; Gary, supra note 42, at 789; Glover, supra note 42, at 91;
Madoff, supra note 39, at 343–44; Boehringer, supra note 41, at 137–38.
65 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (1969) (amended 2010) (stating that the
child would not receive a share, “if it appears from the will that the omission
was intentional or if the testator provided for [that child] by transfer outside the
will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown by the testator’s statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of
the transfer or other evidence.”); Glover, supra note 42, at 92–93.
66 Leslie, supra note 55, at 236–37; Ryznar & Devaux, supra note 40, at 1.
67 See Leslie, supra note 55, at 236–37; Madoff, supra note 39, at 345.
68 SeeMadoff, supra note 39, at 345.
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“[P]robate courts in the United States [also have] discretionary
power to deviate from a testator’s will under . . . family allowance
statutes,”69 which most states have adopted.70 The allowance
provides only temporary short-term protection,71 during the
probate period or the administration of the estate.72 Yet they
provide significant protection against disinheritance for families in
need.73 Another protection could be obtained through the use of
homestead allowance. The homestead allowance could free certain
real estate from creditors, either permanently or for the duration of
the surviving spouse’s life or the minority of the children.74
Minor children lack the legal capacity to execute a will.75 Thus,
minor children, unable to distribute their property the way they
69 Brashier, supra note 48, at 134.
70 Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1189 (1986). The
Uniform Probate Code makes provisions for family allowance asserting that the
decedent’s surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was
obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported by the
decedent are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of the estate for
their maintenance during the period of administration. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-
404 (1969).
71 Brashier, supra note 48, at 134.
72 Glendon, supra note 70, at 1189.
73 Id.
74 See Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to be Born: The American Law of
Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of protected Inheritance,
41 HASTINGS L. J. 1197, 1243 n.271 (1990). The Uniform Probate Code
recognizes the homestead allowance and asserts that a decedent’s surviving
spouse is entitled to a homestead allowance of a certain amount. See UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-402 (1969). If there is no surviving spouse, each minor child
and each dependent child of the decedent is entitled to a homestead allowance
amounting to the same amount divided by the number of minor and dependent
children of the decedent. Id. Homestead allowance is in addition to any share
passing to the surviving spouse or minor or dependent child by the will of the
decedent, unless otherwise provided, by intestate succession, or by way of
elective share. Id.
75 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-501 (1969) (“An individual 18 or more
years of age who is of sound mind may make a will.”); Brashier, supra note 48,
at 170; Madoff, supra note 39, at 337. The exception being Georgia, where the
minimum age for executing a valid will is 14 and Louisiana where the minimum
age requirement is 16. Glover, supra note 42, at 70, 108, 117–18. There are
other exceptions to the testamentary incapacity of minors allowing children to
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want, die intestate and their property is allocated to their parents.
Essentially, the categorical testamentary incapacity of minors
grants forced inheritance to their parents. The forced inheritance of
the entire estate is awarded to the parents “regardless of whether
they fulfill their duty to support their children [and] . . .
irrespective of the size of the estate.”76 Often, minor children do
not possess many assets. Sometimes, though, minor children can
be affluent due to gifts or inheritance or as a result of their efforts
which led them to being famous.77 Thus, when a child wishes to
disinherit a parent, he or she does not have the means to do so.
To conclude, the parent-child status has a significant impact on
inheritance law on several levels. First, if a person dies intestate his
or her estate usually goes to their descendants, even if they would
have chosen otherwise.78 If the deceased does not have children,
the estate could go to their ascendants.79 Second, even if the
testator executes a will, in some countries, children and parents
have a forced share in the estate.80 In other countries, family
maintenance laws protect certain family members and other
dependents of the decedent against disinheritance.81 In the United
States, Louisiana is the only state that has forced inheritance law.82
Yet, pretermitted heir statutes, family allowance statutes,
formalities, and doctrines such as mental capacity, undue
execute wills under certain circumstances. Id. Those situations include, in some
of the states, emancipated children, children who are married and children who
are members of the armed forces. Id. (listing the age of legal capacity and the
exceptions in each state).
76 Glover, supra note 42, at 109.
77 See, e.g., Amanda Massa, Justin Bieber Leads List of Celebrity 100
Newcomers, FORBS (May 18, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/2011/05/16/celeb
rity-100-11-newcomers-justin-bieber.html (stating that at the age of 17 Justin
Bieber earned 53 million dollars in one year); Sammy Said, The Top 10 Richest
Teen Celebrities, RICHEST (August 31, 2013), http://www.therichest.com/rich-
list/world/the-top-10-richest-teen-celebrities (providing a list of rich teen
celebrities).
78 See sources cited supra note 45.
79 See Boehringer supra note 41, at 122, 137-38.
80 See Brashier, supra note 48, at 117; Madoff, supra note 39, at 342–43;
Ryznar & Devaux, supra note 40, at 9; McLearen, supra note 48, at 325–27.
81 See supra notes 55–57.
82 See supra note 62.
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influence, fraud, and public policy, are used by courts throughout
the United States to intervene and change the way the testator
chose to allocate the estate in cases of family disinheritance.83
C. Maintenance of Adult Relatives
The parent-child status has implications that are reflected in
filial responsibility statutes. It would no doubt come as a surprise
to some people that more than half the states in the United States
have some kind of filial responsibility statutes.84 These statutes
create a duty among related adults to support each other if one
becomes indigent.85 Different countries around the world have
filial responsibility statutes concerning the relationships between
adult parents and adult children, siblings, and grandparents and
grandchildren. The statutes that exist in the United States relate
mainly to the relationship between parents and their adult
children.86
Filial responsibility statutes in the United States create a duty,
with some exceptions, for adult children to support their indigent
83 SeeMadoff, supra note 39, at 345–46.
84 Christina Lesher, et al., Who’s Bill is it Anyway? Adult Children’s
Responsibility to Care for Parents, 6 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L. J. 247, 250–
51 (2014); Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era:
Domestic and International Comparison of Enforcement Practices for Laws
Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 ELDER L. J. 269, 271,
278, 304–13 (2013) [hereinafter Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern
Era]; Allison E. Ross, Taking Care of Our Caretakers: Using Filial
Responsibility Laws to Support the Elderly Beyond the Government’s
Assistance, 16 ELDER L. J. 167, 168 (2008). For a table of the filial laws
according to state, see Katherine Pearson, Family/Filial Responsibility/Support
Statutes in the United States, PA. ST. UNIV. (updated Mar. 5, 2012),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Pearson/FilialResponsibilityStatutes.pdf
[hereinafter Pearson, Family/Filial Responsibility/Supporting Statutes in the
United States].
85 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 141; Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the
Modern Era, supra note 84, at 270.
86 Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents:
Intergenerational Responsibilities in International Perspective, 86 MARQ. L.
REV. 401, 422, 425 (2002) (stating that, “[i]n some states the obligation to
support [extends] to grandchildren.”) [hereinafter Moskowitz, Adult Children
and Indigent Parents].
CUTTING OFF THE UMBILICAL CORD 601
parents.87 Those laws are rarely enforced, however.88 Some of the
states have criminal laws with criminal sanctions for failure to
support indigent parents,89 some have civil statutes,90 and some
have both.91 There is no common law duty to support one’s
parents;92 thus, in states that do not have filial support statutes, an
obligation to support one’s indigent parent cannot be established.
Nevertheless, in some cases, “courts have recognized a duty
through the law of contracts.”93
In some states, children who have been abused, neglected or
abandoned by their parents can be excused from the duty to
support.94 This exemption is based on the reciprocal theory.95
87 Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era, supra note 84, at 271;
Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern
Society?, 26 FAM. L. Q. 195, 200–01 (1992); Boehringer, supra note 41, at 141.
88 Lesher, et al., supra note 84, at 251; Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the
Modern Era, supra note 84, at 272, 279–80; Ross, supra note 84, at 168, 185;
Boehringer, supra note 41, at 132; Katie Wise, Caring for Our Parents in an
Aging World: Sharing Public and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 563, 564, 574 (2002).
89 Donna Harkness, What Are Families For? Re-evaluating Return to Filial
Responsibility Laws, 21 ELDER L. J. 305, 321 n. 87 (2013); Moskowitz, Adult
Children and Indigent Parents, supra note 86, at 426; Matthew Pakula, A
Federal Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform Tool to Help Combat the Wave
of Indigent Elderly, 39 FAM. L. Q. 859, 862–64 (2005); Pearson, Filial Support
Laws in the Modern Era, supra note 84, at 276; Ross, supra note 84, at 173–77;
Jared M. DeBona, Mom, Dad, Here’s Your Allowance: The Impending
Reemergence of Pennsylvania’s Filial Support Statute and an Appeal for its
Amendment, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 849, 859, n.89–90 (2014) (listing the relevant
statutes).
90 Harkness, supra note 89, at 321–22 (listing the statutes of the various
states); Pakula, supra note 89, at 863; Ross, supra note 84, at 173–77; DeBona,
supra note 89, at 859, n. 89, 91 (listing the relevant statutes).
91 Ross, supra note 84, at 174; DeBona, supra note 89, at 859 n.89 (listing
the relevant statutes).
92 Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512, 514 (Iowa Super Ct. 1861); Sharpe v.
Sharpe, 163 A.2d. 923, 924 (Pa. Super. 1960) (Wright, J., concurring); Pearson,
Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era, supra note 84, at 278; DeBona, supra
note 89, at 864; Wise, supra note 88, at 572.
93 Pakula, supra note 89, at 865.
94 See Shannon Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty
to Support Our Parents Be Effectively Enforced?, 39 FAM. L. Q. 501, 504
(2002); Harkness, supra note 89, at 325; Lesher, et al., supra note 84, at 252;
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According to this theory, adult children should provide for their
parents when in need since the parents have supported and raised
them during their minor years.96 Thus, children whose parents
abused, neglected or abandoned them are exempt from supporting
their indigent parents.
Until the 1960s nearly all states had filial responsibility
statutes.97 During the first half of the twentieth century, courts
often enforced filial support laws.98 The Great Depression brought
about the initiation of public support system for the elderly.99 In
the years that followed, the Social Security system, Medicare, and
Medicaid reduced the use of these laws.100 Some attribute the
decline in the application of filial responsibility statutes mainly to
Medicaid, which prohibited the state from considering the income
of applicants’ children over the age of twenty-one when
determining eligibility.101 Yet, the pendulum might be swinging
Michael Lundberg, Our Parent’s Keepers: The Current Status of American
Filial Responsibility Laws; 11 J. L. & FAM. STUD., 533, 536 (2009); Seymour
Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, 9 J.
L. & POL’Y 709, 715, 718 (2001) [hereinafter Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility
Statues]; Pakula, supra note 89, at 866; Boehringer, supra note 41, at 134–35.
95 Ann Britton, America’s Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child’s Duty to
Support Aged Parents, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 351, 356 (1990); Boehringer, supra
note 41, at 141; Edelstone, supra note 94, at 504; Kline, supra note 87, at 205.
96 See sources cited supra note 95.
97 Britton, supra note 95, at 357 (listing the five states that never had filial
responsibilities statutes); DeBona, supra note 89, at 856; Kline, supra note 87, at
196 (stating that five states apparently never adopted such legislation: Florida,
Texas, Kansas, Washington, and Wyoming).
98 DeBona, supra note 89, at 857; Edelstone, supra note 94, at 508; Kline,
supra note 87, at 198; Lesher et al., supra note 84, at 248; Ross, supra note 84,
at 173.
99 DeBona, supra note 89, at 858; Lesher et al., supra note 84, at 250; Ross,
supra note 84, at 173; John Walters, Pay Unto Others as They Have Paid Unto
You: An Economic Analysis of the Adult Child’s Duty to Support an Indigent
Parent, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 376, 376–77 (2001–2002).
100 See sources cited supra note 99.
101 DeBona, supra note 89, at 858; Edelstone, supra note 94, at 508; Kline,
supra note 87, at 199–200; Lesher et al., supra note 84, at 248–49; Lundberg,
supra note 94, at 583; Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes, supra note 94,
at 714–15; Pakula, supra note 89, at 861–62.
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back towards enforcing filial support laws.102 “Filial responsibility
has gained renewed attention in recent years,”103 with some
commentators suggesting going back to using these laws.104 The
percent of elderly people in the United States population, as well as
in other western countries, continues to increase, and so does
average life expectancy.105 Low saving rates and retirement
incomes increase the number of elderly who will be below the
poverty level.106 As baby boomers are reaching retirement age,107
and the economic reality is incapable of accommodating that,108
the prospect of retreating to apply filial responsibility laws does
not seem so far-fetched.
As these substantive fields illustrate, the legal implications the
parental status conveys on both the parent and the child transcend
what are usually considered the rights and responsibilities of a
102 See DeBona, supra note 89, at 850, 873.
103 Lesher et al., supra note 84, at 269.
104 See, e.g., Lundberg, supra note 94, at 587 (asserting that the
enforcement of filial responsibility statutes would be beneficial for the society
and provide desperately needed relief for our strained public treasury).
Furthermore, the commentator states that legislatures should consider reinstating
these laws. Id.; Pakula, supra note 89, at 870–71 (advocating for creating a
federal filial support law); Ross, supra note 84, at 207–09 (recommending filial
responsibility laws should be created and enforced, and advocating for a model
or uniform filial responsibility law); Walters, supra note 99, at 377–79 (arguing
that “uniform national recognition and enforcement of adult’s child filial
responsibility to indigent parents is economically more efficient than having
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid bear the burden.”).
105 See Lundberg, supra note 94, at 581; Moskowitz, Adult Children and
Indigent Parents, supra note 86, at 402–03; Andrea Rickles-Jordan, Filial
Responsibility: A Survey Across Time and Oceans, 9 MARQ. ELDER’S
ADVISOR 183, 183–86 (2007); Boehringer, supra note 41, at 123; Lara Queen
Plaisance, Will You Still . . . When I’m Sixty-Four: Adult Children’s Legal
Obligation to Aging Parents, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 245, 247
(2008); JENNIFER M. ORTMAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AN AGING
NATION: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES – POPULATION
ESTIMATES AND PROJECTION (2014), https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p2
5-1140.pdf.
106 See Pakula, supra note 89, at 860.
107 Harkness, supra note 89, at 306–07; Boehringer, supra note 41, at 123–
24; Plaisance, supra note 105, at 247; ORTMAN ET AL., supra note 105.
108 Boehringer, supra note 41, at 125.
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parent towards his minor child,109 and are relevant during the
child’s adulthood. The legal options available today for voluntarily
abrogating the parental status do not offer a much-needed
comprehensive solution.
III. ABROGATION OF PARENTHOOD
Parenthood is conceived as a status for life and beyond, a
conception well embedded in the law.110 There is no doubt that the
parent-child relationship is essential to both the child and the
parent, and is highly valued by society. Yet, sometimes the
relationship does not satisfy its purpose. Nevertheless, the law, by
and large, does not establish a way to sever the parent-child bond
by choice.
The options that currently exist in law to sever the parental
status include involuntary termination of the parental status by
state intervention and abrogation of the status by choice.111 The
doctrine of child emancipation is an intermediate solution. It does
not sever the parent-child status, nevertheless, it diminishes and
restricts the parental control over their child’s life by granting the
child legal autonomy.112 The growing phenomenon of divorcing
fathers petitioning for a genetic testing to undermine their paternity
and disestablish it,113 will not be addressed. This Article is
109 By referring to something that is usually considered as the rights and
responsibilities of a parent towards his minor child, this Article is referring to
rights such as the right to the custody of the child, to discipline the child, to
make decisions regarding the upbringing of the child, to decide where the child
shall live, and obligations regarding the support of the child and care for the
child. See generally Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status,
supra note 2, at 884.
110 SeeMahoney, supra note 3, at 639–40.
111 See infra Parts III.A & III.B.
112 See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 9, at 259.
113 See generally Vanessa S. Brown-Barbour, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s
Maybe”: Disestablishment of Paternity, 48 AKRON L. REV. 263, 264–65 (2015);
Brandon James Hoover, Establishing the Best Answer to Paternity
Disestablishment, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 145 (2011); Melanie B. Jacobs,
When Daddy Doesn’t Want to be Daddy Anymore: An Argument Against
Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J. L. FEMINISM 193, 193–94, 199, 216–17
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interested in situations in which parents want to abrogate a
recognized bond. These fathers, on the other hand, are trying to
prove that they were not parents in the first place, that they are not
parents at all and have never fit in the definition. Thus, they wish
to disestablish paternity.
A. Involuntary Termination of Parental Status by State
Intervention
Involuntary termination of parental status is usually referred to
as “termination of parental rights,” even though the two are not
identical.114 Involuntary termination of parental rights is part of
adoption law.115 An essential prerequisite to adoption is
termination of parental rights, either by the legal parents’ informed
consent or based on grounds for involuntary termination of
parental rights.116 “Once parental rights are terminated, [the] child
(2004); Maegan Padgett, The Plight of a Putative Father: Public Policy v.
Paternity Fraud, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 874 (2005).
114 Theoretically, a parent could lose his parental rights and still be the
child’s parent. Such is the case when a parent loses custody rights. The parental
status is comprised of rights and duties as well as legal standing. This Part will
use the term “termination of parental rights,” which is the term used in literature
and in the law. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Bartlett,
Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status, supra note 2, at 886 (stating that
“only if the parent abandons the child or seriously violates his parental duties
will the state terminate his parental status” and when discussing adoption,
stating that “adoption requires these parents’ consent or a court-ordered
termination of their rights.”). Id. at 895. See also Susan B. Hershkowitz, Due
Process and the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 FAM. L. Q. 245, 282 (1985);
James H. Lincoln, Model Statute for Termination of Parental Rights, 27 JUV.
JUST. 3 (1976); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State: The
Construction of a New Family Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78,
78 (2011); Eric V. Meeker, Termination of Parental Rights: Constitutional
Rights, State Interests and The Best Interests of the Child, 17 J. JUV. L. 82
(1996); Joleen Okun, Termination of Parental Rights, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
761, 761 (2005).
115 See Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As An Exclusive Status, supra note
2, at 895; Lincoln, supra note 114, at 5; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 647.
116 David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of
the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 771 (1999).
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and his or her parents . . . become legal strangers.”117 “The
termination of parental rights constitutes a permanent severance of
the parent-child relationship.”118
The State has an interest to protect the welfare of its children.
Thus, in its capacity as Parens Patriae119 the state can intervene in
the family.120 The state has a wide range of power for limiting
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s
welfare.121 Yet, the state’s power to interfere with parental rights
has limitations.122 The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment denotes
also the right of the individual “to marry, establish a home and
bring up children . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.”123 Furthermore, several Supreme Court
rulings have recognized parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the
upbringing, care, custody, and control of their children.124 States
117 Louise A. Leduc, No-Fault Termination of Parental Rights in
Connecticut: A Substantive Due Process Analysis, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1195, 1197
(1996); Sec’y of Soc. and Rehab. Serv. v. Clear, 804 P.2d 961, 967 (Kan. 1991)
(“A person who has relinquished parental rights through adoption, a voluntary
termination of parental rights, or an involuntary severance of parental rights is
no longer a parent. These statutory procedures contemplate a complete
severance of the child’s ties and relationship with his or her natural parents. The
parent whose rights have been severed is relieved of all duties and obligations to
the child.”); C.J.H. v. A.K.G., No. M2001-01234-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL
1827660, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
118 Hershkowitz, supra note 114, at 282.
119 Parens Patriae is Latin for “parent of the country” and refers to the power
of the state to act as guardian for those who are unable to care for themselves,
such as children. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1969); WEST
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2nd ed. 2008).
120 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944); Hershkowitz,
supra note 114, at 246, 249.
121 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67.
122 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649, 658 (1972); Hershkowitz, supra
note 114, at 249, 252–54; Okun, supra note 114, at 761, 766–67.
123 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
124 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–535 (1925); Prince, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66
(2000) (“[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
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must prove parental unfitness to terminate parental rights.125 The
Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to a fitness
hearing before parental rights could be terminated,126 and set the
burden of proof a state has to meet to justify involuntary
termination of parental rights as clear and convincing evidence.127
State law regulates the family,128 including involuntary
termination of parental rights.129 Though the grounds for state
intervention in the family may vary from state to state, there is a
common thread. The grounds of abuse, neglect, dependency,
abandonment, and deprivation are common.130 Around half the
states permit courts to consider parental incarceration or a criminal
conviction when deciding whether to terminate parental rights.131
Many states impose an additional requirement for termination of
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court . . . . In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children.”).
125 In dicta: Quilloin v.Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977). In some states, the statutes
concerning termination of parental rights dictate that parental unfitness should
be proved before termination of parental rights could take place. See, e.g.,
O.R.S. § 419B.502 (“The rights of the parent or parents may be
terminated . . . . if the court finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of
a single or recurrent incident of extreme conduct toward any child.”); U.C.A.
1953 § 78A-6-503(12) (“Wherever possible family life should be strengthened
and preserved, but if a parent is found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to
be unfit or incompetent based upon any of the grounds for termination described
in this part, the court shall then consider the welfare and best interest of the child
of paramount importance in determining whether termination of parental rights
shall be ordered.”); Id. at § 78A-6-507 (stating the parent’s unfitness as one of
the grounds for termination of parental rights).
126 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 649, 658 (1972).
127 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
128 Griffith, supra note 62, at 520–21, 530; Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon
of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 831 (2004); Hershkowitz, supra note
114, at 245.
129 Hershkowitz, supra note 114, at 246.
130 Patricia Lenore Delahoyde, Termination of Parental Rights, 8 J. JUV. L.
261, 263–69 (1984); Leduc, supra note 117, at 1205–06; Meyer, supra note 116,
at 771.
131 Kennedy, supra note 114, at 78, 95–96.
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parental rights.132 The state must show that the detrimental
condition is likely to continue in the future.133 Another
requirement, which is usually addressed after the grounds for
termination have been established, is that the termination is in the
child’s best interest.134
By and large, state law stipulated that termination of a parent’s
legal relationship with a child requires blameworthy behavior.135
“Traditionally, the only widely accepted no-fault ground for
terminating [parental rights] was a parent’s inability to provide
care, [for instance when] a parent’s physical or mental
disability . . . makes competent [parenthood] impossible.”136 Only
a few jurisdictions provide no-fault grounds for termination of
parental rights that go beyond parental fault and incapacity.137 Yet,
the courts in these jurisdictions have generally interpreted the no-
fault statutes narrowly and have read into them a requirement to
find some kind of parental culpability.138 One example is
Connecticut, which permits termination of parental rights on the
ground that there is “no ongoing parent-child relationship.”139 The
scope of this ground for termination has been severely limited over
132 Delahoyde, supra note 130, at 269.
133 Id.
134 Hershkowitz, supra note 114, at 288.
135 Id. at 284; Meyer, supra note 116, at 771, 775.
136 Meyer, supra note 116, at 778.
137 Id. (giving New Mexico, Connecticut and New Jersey as examples and
stating that traditionally, the only widely accepted “no-fault” ground for
terminating parental rights was a parent’s inability to provide care, such as in
cases where a parent’s physical or mental disability makes competent parenting
impossible). Other grounds include a situation in which the child has lived and
bonded with a new family while the “parent-child relationship” between the
child and her biological parents has “disintegrated”, as in a New Mexico Statute.
Id.
138 Id. at 778–79.
139 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(J) (2014) (“Parent-child relationship”
is defined by law as “the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a
parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and
educational needs of the child.”); Leduc, supra note 117, at 1196, 1206–07
(arguing that the “no ongoing parent-child relationship” ground for termination
of parental rights in Connecticut is unconstitutional); Id. at 778.
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the years by the Connecticut Supreme Court.140 Moreover, the
constitutionality of no-fault grounds for termination of parental
rights is questionable.141 Based on the Supreme Court decisions in
Stanley v. Illinois142 and Santosky v. Kramer,143 the state must
prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence to justify
involuntary termination of parental rights.144 Thus, “no-fault”
ground for involuntary termination of parental rights, can be said
to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.145
Though the grounds and procedure for terminating parental
rights are defined by state law, federal law also has an influence on
the subject matter.146 First, the state’s power is restricted by the
Constitution.147 Furthermore, there is also federal statutory law
concerning adoption. The primary relevant federal law is the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”).148 The
purpose of the ASFA was to reduce the time children spend in
foster care and to encourage states to progress more efficiently
140 Leduc, supra note 117, at 1207. In In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous),
the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the “no ongoing parent-child
relationship” ground is only appropriate if “the child has no present memories or
feelings for the natural parent.” In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous) 420 A.2d
875, 886 (Conn. 1979). In In re Jessica M., the Connecticut Supreme Court
asserted that the statutory language of this ground is ambiguous when applied to
noncustodial parents who must maintain their relationship with their children
through visitations. In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 601 (Conn. 1991). In In re
Valerie D., the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that termination of parental
rights is inappropriate where the finding of “no ongoing parent-child
relationship” directly results from prior custody determination. In re Valerie D.,
613 A.2d 748, 769–70 (Conn. 1992) (in this case the child had been in foster
care since birth due to her mother’s prenatal drug use).
141 Leduc, supra note 117, at 1223; Meyer, supra note 116, at 782.
142 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
143 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
144 Santosky, 455 U.S. 747–48; see Stanley, 405 U.S. 649, 658.
145 Leduc, supra note 117, at 1210, 1223; Meyer, supra note 116, at 782–
785.
146 Okun, supra note 114, at 762.
147 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63
(1977); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
148 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115; Okun, supra note 114, at 762.
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towards termination of parental rights in the appropriate
instances.149
This Section presented the severance of the parent-child
relationship by using the state’s power to intervene in the family
and involuntarily terminate parental rights. This Article’s main
concern, however, are situations in which a child or a parent
wishes to terminate the parental status by choice and without
having another person adopt the child instead. The next Section,
therefore, will discuss the legal means available for abrogating the
parental status by choice.
B. Abrogation by Choice
By and large, a parent cannot waive his or her parental status
outside the realm of adoption law.150 A parent may consent to
terminate his or her status relationship with a child according to
states’ laws governing termination of parental rights151 in order to
free the child for adoption.152 An adoptive parent can abrogate the
adoption under certain conditions.153 Both termination of parental
rights and the abrogation of adoption are part of adoption law.154
Termination of parental rights statutes were “designed
primarily for the benefit and protection of minor children.”155
Typically, these laws are used for involuntary termination of
parental rights.156 Nevertheless, the statutes afford voluntary
149 Meyer, supra note 116, at 772; Okun, supra note 114, at 762.
150 Another doctrine for voluntary relinquishment of parental status by
parents uses “safe-haven” laws that allow the parents of newborns to leave them
anonymously in assigned locations and have immunity from prosecution. Carol
Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 753, 754–55 (2006).
151 The court has to make sure that the parent has voluntarily and
knowingly consented to the termination. See In re Finnegan–Cole P., No.
F04CP12009647A, 2013 WL 870229, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2013).
152 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 640.
153 See infra notes 183–190 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 115; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 640, 656-657; C.J.H. v.
A.K.G., No. M2001-01234-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug 9, 2002).
155 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 640.
156 See id.
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termination of parental rights as well.157 “[T]hese . . . statutes
[foresee the] two primary [situations] in which [a] court may
accept a parent’s voluntary [relinquishment] of his or her [parental
status].158 First, [a] parent [could] agree to terminate [his] status in
order to free a child for adoption by another adult.”159 Such is the
case when the non-custodian parent agrees to waive his parental
status so the spouse or partner of the custodian parent could adopt
the child. “Second, a parent may consent to [terminate] his
[parental status] as to a child who has been adjudicated dependent .
. . within the child welfare system, [regardless of whether adoption
by another person] is planned.”160
There are other situations in which termination of parental
rights statutes could be applied. Legal databases reveal scattered
cases involving parents who seek to terminate their status not
related to pending adoption welfare proceedings.161 The common
thread among these cases is the paramount consideration given to
the best interest of the child.162 Courts in many of the cases
emphasized the importance of child support as a factor in the
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.; State ex. rel. Sec’y of Soc. & Rehab. Serv. v. Clear, 804 P.2d 961,
966 (Kan. 1991) (“The State’s primary goal for all children whose parents’
parental rights have been terminated is placement in a permanent family
setting . . . . After parental rights have been terminated, the court may grant
custody of the child for adoption proceedings or for long-term foster care, if it
does not appear that adoption is a viable alternative.”).
161 The Texas Court of Appeals stated that the relevant provision is “rarely
used” and that it is most commonly used when the birth mother wants to place
her baby for adoption. In the Interest of J.K.B. and J.D.B., 439 S.W.3d 442, 444
(Tex. App. 2014) (quoting In the Interest of T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d 481, 483, 483 n.1
(Tex. App. 2001)); Dockery v. State of Texas, No. 03-05-00713-CV, 2006 WL
3329794 (Tex. App. Nov. 14, 2006).
162 In re Bruce R., 662 A.2d. 107, 117 (Conn. 1995); In re Finnegan–Cole
P., No. F04CP12009647A, 2013 WL 870229, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30,
2013); In the Interest of J.L.W, 496 N.W. 2d 280, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992);
C.J.H. v. A.K.G., No. M2001-01234-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002); In the Interest of T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d 481, 483–84
(2001); Dockery, 2006 WL 3329794, at *1; In re Michael I.O., 551 N.W.2d.
855, 857 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
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decision.163 Some courts denied the petition to terminate parental
rights on the grounds that such termination extinguishes parental
support obligations, and that absent other factors in favor of
termination (such as harm to the child if termination is denied), it
would not be in the best interest of the child.164
Not all states allow the application of termination statutes
outside the context of adoption. In Tennessee, although the Court
of Appeals examined the best interest of the child in the matter of
C.J.H. v. A.K.G,165 it also concluded that none of the statutory
procedures for relinquishment of parental rights would be available
to the father.166 In this case, a child was born after a brief affair and
the father and mother did not have any relationship following that
affair.167 The father met his monetary obligations, but did not see
his daughter since her birth, or attempt to see her, and had no
interest in establishing a relationship with her.168 “The mother and
father submitted a joint petition to terminate the father’s parental
rights[.]”169 “[The] [m]other testified that . . . she understood the
impact of the decision [and that] . . . she was more than adequately
employed to financially care for the child and . . . had strong
family support to assist her.”170 The Tennessee Court of Appeals
denied the petition.171 Considering the statutory framework, the
court asserted that “[a]lthough [the] statutes allow, in some
circumstances, for a voluntary surrender of parental rights . . .
163 In re Bruce R., 662 A.2d. at 117; C.J.H., 2002 WL 1827660, at *2; In re
Michael I.O., 551 N.W.2d. at 857.
164 See In re Bruce R., 662 A.2d. at 108–09 (1995); C.J.H., 2002 WL
1827660, at *7–9; In re Michael I.O., 551 N.W.2d. at 858. It is interesting to
note, that the one case in which financial consideration and the child’s loss of
support were not given such a high credence, involved a same-sex couple. The
facts of this case are not so different from other cases in which courts denied the
petition to terminate the parental rights of one of the parents. Compare In re
Finnegan–Cole P., 2013 WL 870229, at *3 (involving a lesbian couple), with
C.J.H., 2002 WL 1827660, at 7–9 (involving a heterosexual couple).
165 C.J.H., 2002 WL 1827660, at *2.
166 Id. at *8.
167 Id. at *1.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at *9.
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those circumstances appear to be present only in the context of an
adoption.”172 “However, [the court found that] there [was] no
statutory authority for use of these procedures outside the context
of an adoption or a plan for an adoption.”173 In another case, In the
Matter of Shawanda R., brought before the Family Court of Kings
County, New York, a father petitioned for judicial surrender of a
sixteen-year-old child.174 The petition was supported by the child
and the mother.175 The court held that it did not have the authority
to approve a surrender under the circumstances presented in this
case.176 After the approval of judicial surrender was denied, the
mother requested that on consent of all the parties, the father be
allowed to move the court to terminate his paternal rights.177 In this
regard, the court held that the father did not have standing to
initiate the judicial termination of his own parental rights.178
In the case of Dockery v. Texas, brought to the Texas Court of
Appeals, a father’s petition to terminate his parental rights over his
adult nineteen-year-old son was denied.179 The father asserted that
his son was an adult and that both of them did not want any
relationship with one another.180 The court called attention to the
fact that “[a]t the hearing, [the father] made it clear that one of his
purposes in seeking a termination was to eliminate his child
support arrearage[,]” and that his sister in her testimony supported
that.181 Yet, considering the court indicated that even if the trial
court were to grant the father voluntary termination, “that
termination would not alter his child support arrearage[,]”182 it
seems that the father’s statements at the hearing regarding his
172 Id. at *7.
173 Id.
174 In re Shawanda R., 841 N.Y.S.2d. 436, 438 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007).
175 Id. at 438.
176 Id. at 439.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 441.
179 Dockery v. State, No. 03-05-00713-CV, 2006 WL 3329794, at *1–2
(Tex. App. Nov. 14, 2006).
180 Id. at 2.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 3.
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support arrearage should not have been a factor in deciding this
case.
Adoptive parents who wish to sever their parental status have
two courses of action. First, they could petition to end their
parental status using termination of parental rights statutes.183
Second, they could nullify the adoption decree in certain
circumstances by filing a petition under adoption laws.184 Adoptive
parents can petition the court to annul the adoption based on fraud,
misrepresentation, or procedural flaws in the adoption
proceedings.185 In states that have no abrogation provision in their
adoption codes, the courts may accommodate adoptive parents’
petitions to set aside final adoption decrees using the court’s
inherent power to correct their own past mistakes.186
Most petitions made by adoptive parents to abrogate the
adoption fall into one of two categories.187 The first concerns
adoptive stepparents who seek to terminate the parental status
following a divorce from the child’s custodial parent.188 The
second includes adoptive parents who allege fraud against the
individual or agency that placed the child for adoption.189
Generally, the statutory grounds for adoption annulment do not
take into consideration the welfare of the child.190 Since the
intention of adoption laws is to create a parent-child relationship
that is equivalent to the relationship between the child and the
parents to whom he was born,191 some commentators argue that
183 In re the Termination of the Parental Rights of Edward Landt to J.J.L.,
No. C3-96-1836, 1997 WL 207601, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (1997); In re
interest of D.C.M, 443 N.W.2d 853, 854–55 (Minn. Ct. App.1989); Linan v.
Linan, 632 S.W.2d 155, 155–56 (Tex. App. 1982).
184 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 656–57 (stating that “[c]urrently, the
adoption codes in nearly two-thirds of the states include judicial annulment
provisions, which permit designated persons, including the adoptive parents, to
petition to set aside a final adoption decree.”).
185 Id. at 657, 661.
186 Id. at 664.
187 Id. at 672–73; Elizabeth N. Carroll, Abrogation of Adoption by Adoptive
Parents, 19 FAM. L. Q. 155, 159 (1985).
188 Carroll, supra note 187, at 159; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 672.
189 Carroll, supra note 187, at 159; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 672–73.
190 Carroll, supra note 187, at 156–57; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 641, 652.
191 Carroll, supra note 187, at 158.
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adoptive parents should have only the legal options available to
biological parents to abrogate parenthood.192 Others assert that the
guidelines for abrogation of adoption should be strictly defined in
legislation, stating the circumstances under which an abrogation
would be allowed, setting a time limit, and establishing the best
interest of the child as the ground rule.193
The right of children to sever the parent-child relationship is an
even more complicated legal issue. This question was addressed in
a famous case, Kingsley v. Kingsley, where a minor child
petitioned the court to terminate his parents’ parental rights.194 The
Kingsley case has become known as the case of the child who
“divorced” his parents.195 The media has mislabeled the case as
“divorce” of a child from his parents whereas in fact, this case was
no more than a common case of termination of parental rights
combined with an adoption proceeding.196 What was special about
192 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 669, 674 (arguing that the abrogation of
adoption doctrine, as it is construed today, is discriminatory against adoptive
children).
193 Carroll, supra note 187, at 174.
194 In re Gregory Kingsley, No. JU90-5245, 1992 WL 551484, at *1 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1992).
195 Lydia Warren, The Boy Who DIVORCED His Parents: 20 Years After
12-Years-Old Legally Split From His Family, He Reveals How He Regrets
Never Reconciling With His Mother Before She Died, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 13,
2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2247696/Shawn-Russ-Boy-
divorced-parents-12-speaks-out.html; see Anthony DePalma, Mother Denies
Abuse of Son Suing to End Parental Tie, N.Y. TIMES (25 Sept. 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/25/us/mother-denies-abuse-of-son-suing-to-
end-parental-tie.html?src=pm (stating that “some conservatives . . . said it would
lead to thousands of frivolous lawsuits by unhappy children seeking to ‘divorce’
their parents”); Opinion, Gregory Needed the Divorce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/29/opinion/gregory-needed-the-
divorce.html; Boy, 12, in Court Seeking ‘Divorce’ from Parents: Family:
Mother Denies her Son’s Allegations of Abuse, Abandonment. Impact of
Outcome Appears Unclear, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-09-25/news/mn-1194_1_foster-family; Boy is
Granted ‘Divorce’ from Natural Parents, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-09-26/news/mn-868_1_foster-parents.
196 Scott A. Cannon, Finding Their Own “Place to Be”: What Gregory
Kingsley’s and Kimberly Mays’ “Divorces” From Their Parents Have Done for
Children’s Rights, 39 LOY. L. REV. 837, 839 (1994).
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this case was that a minor child brought the suit in his own
name.197 Eleven-year-old Gregory filed a petition for termination
of his parents’ parental rights seeking adoption by George and
Lizabeth Russ.198 Gregory’s father consented to termination of his
parental rights and to the adoption, however his mother opposed
termination.199 The Florida Circuit Court found that the minor
child had legal standing to pursue termination of the parent-child
relationship.200 Furthermore, the court found that termination of
parental rights was in the best interest of the child and that it was
established by clear and convincing evidence.201 On appeal, the
court agreed with Gregory’s mother that according to the law, a
minor lacks the legal capacity to initiate an action for termination
of parental rights.202 However, the appellate court found the error
to be a harmless one because four other petitions were filed on
Gregory’s behalf.203 In addition, the court characterized the
“disability of non-age” as procedural because such defect can be
cured by the subsequent appointment of a next friend or guardian
ad litem.204 Thus, some commentators argue that, although a minor
in Florida does not have standing to file a petition to terminate
parental rights on his own behalf, the procedural requirement that a
guardian ad litem will file the petition in the minor’s name seems
to have no real substance.205
Although it seems that, at least in Florida, a minor child could
initiate a termination of parental rights suit by appointing an adult
197 Id. at 839.
198 In re Gregory Kingsley, 1992 WL 551484, at *1, *5.
199 Id. at *1.
200 Id.
201 Id. at *4.
202 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
203 Kingsley, 623 So.2d at 785 (discussing that separate petitions for
termination of parental rights were filed on behalf of Gregory by the foster
father, the guardian ad litem, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, and the foster mother).
204 Id. at 785.
205 Cannon, supra note 196, at 847; Kerry Lorraine McBride, A Minor’s
Right to “Divorce” His or Her Parents: Fundamental Liberty Interest and
Standing of a Minor who is Dependent on the Courts to Bring Termination of
Parental Rights Proceedings, 17 J. JUV. L. 68, 75 (1996).
CUTTING OFF THE UMBILICAL CORD 617
representative, one should remember that in order for the petition
to be granted, the statutory grounds for termination should be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.206 In Gregory Kingsley’s
case, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment and neglect.207 Thus, even in this unique case, the
termination of parental rights took place in the contextual
framework of adoption law and procedure. There is no clear
procedure allowing a child who wishes to sever the parental bond
with his parents to do so outside the realm of adoption law.
Twigg v. Mays, another famous case in Florida, concerned
Kimberly Mays, a minor who had been switched at birth.208
Kimberly filed a petition against her “biological parents” to “sever
all ties with them.”209 The petition came in response to the suit
filed by her biological parents to be declared her biological parents
and her natural guardians, and to be awarded custody.210 The court
found that Kimberly had standing to sue on her own behalf.211 The
court found that “forced visitation [was] likely to produce mental,
physical, or emotional harm of a lasting nature to [Kimberly].”212
Furthermore, the court concluded that even the adjudication of
paternity and the declaration of her as the plaintiffs’ biological
child would be detrimental to her.213
No doubt, this case was unique.214 The minor filed the
countersuit to terminate all ties with the parents she never knew up
until the trial had started.215 The purpose of the countersuit was to
preserve her family ties and the relationship she had with the only
206 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982); In re Kingsley, 1992
WL 551484, at *1.
207 In re Kingsley, 1992 WL 551484, at * 1–2.
208 Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *1– 2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993).
209 Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at * 1; Cannon, supra note 196, at 849.
210 Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at *3.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 5–6.
214 Id. at 3 (stating that “the factual situation in this case is certainly
unique”, and that “neither counsel for the parties nor the Court has been able to
find an appellate decision anywhere which is precisely on point.”).
215 Id. at *2; Cannon, supra note 196, at 850.
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parents she knew her entire life.216 Thus, a general rule cannot
possibly be learned from this exceptional case.
Regarding the abrogation of adoption by the adopted child,
“#ermont and West #irginia allow the adoptee to bring an action
to abrogate the adoption within one year after reaching
majority.”217 Note, this is an exception relevant only in these two
states and is applicable only to adoptees who have reached
adulthood, not to minors. Since the intention of adoption laws is to
create a parent-child relationship that is equivalent to the
relationship between the child and the parents to whom he was
born,218 one can wonder why adoptees have this option, while
biological children do not.
The provisions allowing the voluntary termination of parental
rights are mainly intended for situations that are part of the
adoption scheme,219 although there are some cases in which the
parents’ petition to terminate their rights is alien to adoption.220
Yet, not all states allow the application of termination statutes
outside the realm of adoption. Furthermore, termination statutes
are not suitable for dealing with other situations. In addition, it
seems that there is no clear procedure allowing a child who wishes
216 See Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at *5 (The court has ruled that the
evidence is clear that Robert Mays is the minor’s psychological parent and the
Plaintiffs are seen by her as a constant source of danger to her father and to her
family relationship).
217 Kathleen M. Lynch, Adoption: Can Adoptive Parents Change Their
Minds?, 26 FAM. L. Q. 257, 269 (1992); Carroll, supra note 187, at 173.
218 See Carroll, supra note 187, at 158.
219 C.J.H. v. A.K.G., No. M2001-01234-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002); Mahoney, supra note 3, at 647.
220 C.J.H., 2002 WL 1827660, at *7 (identifying that voluntary termination
of parental rights only occurs “in the context of an adoption.”). The Texas Court
of Appeals stated that the relevant provision is “rarely used” and that it is most
commonly used when “the birth mother wants to place her baby for adoption.”
In the Interest of J.K.B. and J.D.B., 439 S.W.3d 442, 444 (Tex. App. 2014)
(quoting In the Interest of T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d 481, 483, 483n.1 (Tex. App.
2001)); Dockery v. State of Texas, No. 03-05-00713-CV, 2006 WL 3329794
(Tex. App. Nov. 14, 2006); In re Bruce R., 662 A.2d. 107, 117 (Conn. 1995); In
re Finnegan–Cole P., No. F04CP12009647A, 2013 WL 870229, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2013); In the Interest of J.L.W, 496 N.W. 2d 280, 281 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1992); Dockery, 2006 WL 3329794, at *1; In re The termination of
Parental Rights of Michael I.O., 551 N.W.2d. 855, 857 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
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to sever the parental bond with his parents, to do so. A different
procedure should be formulated for dealing with situations not
involving the welfare system or adoption. The provisions for the
severance of the parent-child status should be enacted as part of the
laws that define and establish legal parenthood.221
C. Emancipation
“Emancipation [is a] process by which minors attain legal
adulthood before reaching the age of majority.”222 The doctrine of
child emancipation does not sever the parent-child status.
Nevertheless, it diminishes and restricts parental control over their
child’s life by granting the child legal autonomy.223 The adult
status minor children achieve through emancipation also usually
means that, “their parents are no longer responsible for [their]
support.”224 Emancipation orders are not permanent.225 In some
states, an emancipation order may be revoked if the circumstances
change and the child has no means of support.226
A child who reaches the age of majority is emancipated
automatically.227 In addition, the emancipation doctrine establishes
221 See Section IV.C.
222 Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 9, at 240.
223 Id. at 258–260; Goldberg, supra note 9, at 188.
224 Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 9, at 241; Lauren C. Barnett, Having
Their Cake and Eating It Too? Post-Emancipation Child Support as a Valid
Judicial Option, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1799, 1808, 1811, 1835 (2013) (stating that
for many centuries the prevailing jurisprudence has held that when a child is
emancipated his parental support ceases and that the notion that emancipation
and child support are mutually exclusive is still prevailing, while contending that
an emancipation order should not automatically terminate a child support
obligation and that in the proper cases a child should continue getting support
from his parents even if he is awarded emancipation). But see Diamond v.
Diamond, 283 P.3d 260, 272 (N.M. 2012) (holding that a minor could be
emancipated for certain purposes while reserving the right to seek support from
her parents).
225 Barnett, supra note 224, at 1828.
226 Id. at 1828–29; Chadwick N. Gardner, Don’t Come Cryin’ to Daddy!
Emancipation of Minors: When is a Parent ‘Free at Last’ From the Obligation
of Child Support?, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 927, 936 (1994-1995).
227 Gardner, supra note 226, at 930–31.
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categories of emancipated minors: married minors, minors on
active duty in the armed forces, and minors emancipated by court
order.228 Most states have statutes codifying the rules of
emancipation.229 The rest of the states continue to grant
emancipation based on common law.230
Generally, the statutes require the emancipation to be in the
best interest of the child in order to be granted.231 Most states have
a minimum age of sixteen for emancipation.232 In addition, states
impose other requirements, such as requiring the petitioner to
demonstrate the ability to live on his own and manage his own
affairs.233 Some states, such as “Montana and #ermont, require
minor petitioners to show that [they are] pursuing a high school
diploma or graduation equivalent.”234
228 Barnett, supra note 224, at 1802; Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 9, at
258 (regarding the law in California).
229 Barnett, supra note 224, at 1803 (stating that 18 states today do not have
statutes concerning emancipation).
230 Id. at 1803.
231 Id. at 1818; Brieanne M. Billie, The “Lost Boys” of Polygamy: Is
Emancipation the Answer?, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 140 (2008)
(stating that in Utah the child emancipation statute establishes that the court
must determine by clear and convincing evidence that emancipation is in the
best interest of the child). At least one commentator supports the notion that
courts should consider the best interests of the parents in addition to those of the
child in emancipation proceedings, for example, see S. Elise Kert, Should
Emancipation Be for Adolescents or for Parents?, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 307, 308–310 (2007) (contending that “statutory emancipation might
prove a windfall for a parent who has little or no control over a teenager” and
“that emancipation of a minor may benefit the parents does not necessarily make
it a bad thing” and that “statutory emancipation laws can work to secure the
right both of minors seeking independent legal status and of parents seeking to
protect themselves against acts of their teenage child for whom they are legally
responsible but no longer responsible in fact.”).
232 T. Christopher Wharton, Deserted in Deseret: How Utah’s
Emancipation Statute is Saving Polygamist Runaways and Queer Homeless
Youths, 10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 213, 220 (2007); Sanger & Willemsen, supra
note 9, at 261 n. 96 (stating that California is the only state that authorizes
emancipation for 14 years old, in all the other states the age minimum is 16).
233 Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 9, at 245–46; Wharton, supra note
232, at 220.
234 Wharton, supra note 232, at 221.
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State statutes differ regarding who may initiate emancipation—
in some states either the parent or the child can initiate the
procedure, while in other states only the child can do so.235 In
many cases, parents petition the court to declare their children
legally emancipated, thereby removing the obligation of support.236
Even in states where only a child could initiate emancipation,
parents can play an important role in encouraging emancipation.
Though emancipation was intended to empower mature minors
through official recognition of their actual independence, in effect,
the process is sometimes initiated due to the parents’ will.237 An
empirical study on the use of emancipation in two northern
California counties found that while in some cases emancipation
provided independent teenagers with legal authority appropriate to
their life situations, in many other cases it was used by parents to
end responsibility for ordinary teenagers who lacked experience or
desire to live independently.238
D. Conclusion
The options that exist currently to sever the legal parental bond
include involuntary termination of parental rights by state
intervention239 and abrogation by choice.240 This Article’s main
concern are situations in which a parent or a child (either minor or
adult) wishes to terminate the parental status by choice. A parent
can consent to terminate his status relationship with his child
according to states’ laws governing termination of parental
rights241 in order to free the child for adoption.242 An adoptive
parent can abrogate the adoption under certain conditions.243 Both
235 Barnett, supra note 224, at 1804–1805.
236 Gardner, supra note 226, at 927.
237 Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 9, at 241.
238 Id. at 242.
239 See discussion, supra Section III.A.
240 See discussion, supra Section III.B.
241 See In re Finnegan–Cole P., No. F04CP12009647A, 2013 WL 870229,
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2013) (stating that the court has to make sure
that the parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination).
242 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 640.
243 See supra notes 183–190 and accompanying text.
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termination of parental rights and the abrogation of adoption are
part of adoption law.244 In addition, it seems that there is no clear
procedure allowing a child who wishes to sever the parental bond
with his parents to do so.245 Today, the law does not provide an
adequate way to sever the parental bond.
IV. THE CASE FORCUTTING THEUMBILICAL CORD
The law should enable an individual to opt out of a relationship
that is unfulfilling or harmful. The parent-child relationship is
among the few legal relationships a person cannot choose to sever.
Taking into consideration that society perceives this relationship as
something very meaningful in one’s life, the disparity between the
notion of parenthood and the reality of one’s real life experience
intensifies the sense of detriment. Currently, the law does not
provide an adequate way to sever the legal bond. This Article
suggests guidelines for severing the parent-child status and
proposes that the provisions be enacted as part of the laws that
define and establish legal parenthood
A. Why What the Law Has to Offer Today is Not Enough
The questions that should be asked regarding the permanent
nature of parenthood concern the relevance and rationale in our
day and age for preserving the parent-child relationship for life. In
the past, the extended family and the community were a common
filial form.246 Today, in most of the western world the nuclear
family and alternative family formations,247 which usually do not
244 Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As An Exclusive Status, supra note 2, at
895; Lincoln, supra note 114, at 5; C.J.H. v. A.K.G., No. M2001-01234-COA-
R3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002); Mahoney, supra note
3, at 647, 656–57.
245 See discussion, supra Section III.B.
246 Kris Franklin, “A Family Like Any Other Family:” Alternative Methods
of Defining Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1035 (1990 –
91).
247 The nuclear family usually refers to a married heterosexual couple and
their biological children. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As An Exclusive
Status, supra note 2, at 879; Triger, supra note 24, at 365. By alternative family
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include the parent-adult child bond, prevail.248 That is not to say
that the bond between a parent and his or her adult child does not
exist or is not meaningful, only that those family ties usually do
not prevail as part of the “central” or “main” family cell and the
parties do not share the same household. Children were once
considered the property of their father,249 and were important as a
work force on the family farm and as a means to distribute
property through inheritance.250 During the twentieth century,
attitudes towards children and children’s place in the family and
society changed,251 and emphasis was placed on the parents’ duty
to support, take care and educate the child.252 The best interest of
the child has become the prevailing principle governing legal
decisions pertaining to the child.253
If the purpose of the parental status is to assign someone the
responsibility and duty to support the child until majority and to
prepare the child for life in society, why doesn’t the status cease
automatically as soon as the child reaches majority? After all,
formations, this Article refers to single parenthood, cohabitation, same-sex
couples and their children, married heterosexuals who decide not to have
children at all, and community parenting. See generally Laura T. Kessler,
Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007) (describing
community parenting).
248 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1037–39,
1045–46 (1992); Franklin, supra note 246, at 1033–1049; J. Thomas Oldham,
What Does the U.S. System Regarding Inheritance Rights of Children Reveal
About American Families?, 35 FAM. L. Q. 265, 271 (1999) (stating that
“Americans are much more inclined to move about the country and are less tied
to a ‘home’ than people from many other countries; it may well be that it is
therefore more common, once American children become adults, for them to
live far from their parents”).
249 Woodhouse, supra note 248, at 1037, 1045–46; see Triger, supra note
24, at 366.
250 Franklin, supra note 246, at 1034–35.
251 Shahar Lifshitz, Neither Nature Nor Contract: Toward an Institutional
Perspective on Parenthood Essay, 8 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 297, 307–308
(2014).
252 Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As An Exclusive Status, supra note 2, at
885.
253 Carroll, supra note 187, at 156–57; Lifshitz, supra note 251, at 307–
308; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 665.
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parents’ legal control over their children does stop when the child
reaches adulthood. The answer might be that parenthood is more
than just a means to serve the interests of the child and society in
taking care of the child, namely that it has significance and value
in and for itself. People value the parent-child relationship.254
Parenthood is a meaningful part of life. It is a unique intimate
relationship that has a special value and which encompasses an
emotional bond. A well-established emotional bond will probably
sustain for life. If that is the case, and most people in society value
their parental relationship and conceive it as a relationship for life,
then it will be reasonable to maintain the legal status for life. Yet,
this justification does not explain why there is no way out of the
relationship in cases that merit it.
Individuals are free to make their own choices regarding their
life (under some limitations). Autonomous individuals have some
control over their intimate relationships by selecting with whom to
form the intimacy and how to shape the relationship. Intimate
relationships are an essential part of meaningful life. This is
especially true in the domain of family law. One of the most
fundamental rights is being able to decide with whom to pursue
intimate relationships and whom to consider family.255 These
decisions reflect and shape one’s identity. A person should have a
say about whom he wants as part of his family. Parents choose
their spouse or partner and have a choice (at least to some extent)
whether to bring a child into the world. This decision might bestow
responsibility to raise and support the child until he or she is able
to stand on his own, but it does not necessarily justify a
commitment for life. Furthermore, even when a person decides to
bring a child into the world, there is no guarantee what the child
will grow up to be and how the parent-child relationship will
develop. The parent cannot possibly knowingly consent to a
relationship for life with a person that does not yet exist. This is all
254 Batts, supra note 74, at 1197 (stating that “the sanctity and inviolability
of the parent-child bond as a fundamental concept imbedded in America’s social
and social structure.”); Brighouse & Swift, supra note 1, at 90–95.
255 The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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the more so regarding children. Children do not choose to come
into the world, do not choose their parents, and do not consent to
the relationship.
The law should enable an individual to opt out of a relationship
that is unfulfilling and sometimes even harmful, or from a
relationship that exists in the legal sphere but not in real life. This
is especially true when the child is an adult, but it is not confined
to that. When it comes to a relationship that society perceives as
something so meaningful in one’s life, the disparity between the
notion of parenthood and the reality of one’s real life experience
intensifies the sense of detriment. Currently, the law does not
provide an adequate way for a person who wishes to sever the legal
bond to do so.
Family law has glorified the number two, creating links among
sex, marriage and procreation, and conceptualizing each as a
practice for two.256 Departure from the optimal parental number
involves criticism.257 Though the law recognizes single parenthood
at the time the child is born (for example when a single mother
uses sperm donation), the law usually does not allow a parent to
abrogate his or her parental status without someone else taking his
or her spot, thus leaving the child with only one parent,258 let alone
leaving a person parentless. There appears to be no reasonable
explanation for the reluctance of the law to render an adult person
parentless.
It seems that even if a solution of some kind could be found
using termination statutes, it would not be an adequate one. The
situations that are the aim of this article are foreign to termination
256 Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents By The Number, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV.
11, 11 (2008–2009); Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I A Parent?”: The Exlusion of
Kinship Caregivers from the Debate Over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 618 (2010); Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents,
More Money: Reflections on the Financial Implications of Multiple Parentage,
16 CARDOZO J. L.& GENDER 217, 220 (2009–2010).
257 Appleton, supra note 256, at 12.
258 See, e.g., In re Michael I.O, 551 N.W.2d. 855, 858 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
(“Cindy testified that there is no foreseeable stepparent adoption of Michael.
‘While the vicissitudes of life place many children in one-parent circumstances,
it is generally better for children to have two parents.’” (quoting A.B., 151
Wis.2d at 322, 444 N.W.2d at 419)).
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statutes. A full consideration should be given to the possibility to
sever the parental status outside the realm of adoption law. The
procedure should be different than the one in adoption cases—a
procedure tailor-made to these cases. In addition, the provisions
should be part of the law governing the definition of parenthood.
In the last decades, the children’s rights doctrine has developed
and expanded extensively.259 As a result, different legal systems
award children rights and standing to voice their opinion in matters
related to them according to the age of the child and his or her
development. A minor should, by extension, also have the legal
right to petition for termination of parental rights, applying the
same standards. One of the arguments that is being raised is that a
child has the right to be cared for by his or her parents.260 This
argument should be taken into consideration when reflecting on the
possibility to sever the parental bond upon the will of a parent,
inasmuch as it should be taken into account when considering a
child’s right not to be considered the son or daughter of a certain
person.
If the child is the one desiring abrogation and the child is a
minor, most states will not allow him to petition the court for
terminating parental rights. Even if the child does have standing
(or is able to petition the court with the help of a guardian ad
litem), he or she would likely have to prove fulfillment of the
grounds set by law for terminating parental rights without the
parents’ consent. That is not an easy task, especially since the
grounds for termination must be proved through clear and
convincing evidence. In addition, there will be situations in which
there will be a good reason to terminate the legal bond, but which
do not fit any of the grounds for terminating parental rights
recognized by law. The law should address those situations as well.
When the petitioning child is an adult, there are no established
designated proceedings to sever the parent-child relationship.
Appropriate provisions should be made for affording the severance
of the parental status for adult children. These provisions should
259 Lifshitz, supra note 251, at 307–308; Woodhouse, supra note 248, at
1055.
260 The International Convention On The Right Of The Child § 7 (1989).
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apply both to cases where the adult child is the petitioner and to
cases where the parent of an adult child is petitioning.
In exceptional cases, the law should permit a petitioning parent
to abrogate his or her parental status when the child is a minor.
This option is available today in certain cases of consent for
adoption and in some states in other situations as well.261 Yet, there
are no comprehensive structured proceedings for petitioning the
court to sever the parental status in cases where no adoptive parent
is about to step in instead of the petitioner. Denial of access to the
courts precludes parent-initiated severance even in cases where the
court might determine that the child’s best interest would be served
by such a result.
B. The Risk of Exploitation or Misapplication of the
Procedure
Without a doubt, some people will intuitively oppose the
proposition that the parental bond is not eternal and could be
terminated. The social convention that perceives parenthood as a
status for life is rooted and grounded in our culture. Others will
base their objections on concrete justifications, such as concern of
exploitation in order to evade financial responsibilities or slippery
slope arguments (such as that the possibility to abrogate the
parental status would lead to the destruction of the family unit, the
deterioration of family values, or the abolition of the parental
status altogether).
Parenthood is conceived as a natural bond for life. Yet,
parenthood is culturally constructed;262 hence, the meanings of
parenthood and of the parent-child relationship have changed over
the years and are different across societies.263 “Cultural
261 See generally Mahoney, supra note 3, at 640; State ex. rel. Sec’y of Soc.
& Rehab. Serv. v. Clear, 248 Kan. 109, 116 (Kan. 1991) (“The State’s primary
goal for all children whose parents’ parental rights have been terminated is
placement in a permanent family setting . . . After parental rights have been
terminated, the court may grant custody of the child for adoption proceedings or
for long-term foster care, if it does not appear that adoption is a viable
alternative.”).
262 Sault, supra note 25, at 399.
263 Id.
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constructions are based on human beliefs, values, and ideologies
that change over time.”264 Thus, the meaning ascribed to
parenthood today could change in the years to come.
Slippery slope arguments are employed often as part of a
counterargument to a proposed change in the law. A slippery slope
argument is constructed in the following manner% “Even if a legal
action ‘A’ today . . . wouldn’t be that bad . . . it should be opposed
because it will increase the [probability] of a . . . worse legal action
‘B’ in the future.”265 Here, the argument will be that even if
abrogation of the parent-child relationship in exceptional cases
would not be that bad, it could lead to much worse outcomes such
as the destruction of the family unit, the deterioration of family
values, and abolition of the parental status.
Slippery slope arguments can be established on two grounds:266
1) a political/psychological ground, contending that although the
two situations are distinguishable, public opinion will change
following action A (abrogation of the parental status) to allow
action B (the destruction of the family unit, the deterioration of
family values, or abolition of the parental status altogether); and 2)
a logic ground, according to which the two situations are not
intrinsically different and thus should be treated the same.
According to the slippery slope arguments, even if allowing the
possibility to abrogate the parental bond outside the realm of
adoption law could be acceptable, it should be opposed because it
may lead to a harmful event. The detrimental or dangerous events
in this case could include the destruction of the family unit, the
deterioration of family values or abolition of the parental status
altogether. The argument is a political/psychological one, stating
that though the two actions are distinguishable, in practice it is
possible that once abrogation of the parental bond would be
available, various actors in the legal system will eventually end up
not distinguishing between them.267
264 Id. at 407.
265 Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2005).
266 Id.; Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 181, 208–10 (2005).
267 Volokh, supra note 265, at 1156.
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Allowing means to abrogate the parental bond in cases that
merit it would not lead to any of the harsh consequences at the
bottom of the slippery slope. The argument for abrogation of the
parental status is indeed, in a way, an argument for liberalization of
the rules regarding parenthood and the parent-child relationship.
Yet the argument does not call for elimination of the parental
status altogether. Various possibilities already exist today for
terminating the parent-child bond, nonetheless those possibilities
did not bring about the abolition of parenthood, the destruction of
the family unit, or deterioration of family values.
Parenthood is a very solid and valued institution in the
American society and there is no apparent reason to believe it
would be abolished. In addition, the family unit is a fundamental
part of our society. Since the definition of “family” and its
composition could change over time, a question could be raised as
to who will be considered a part of the “family.” Yet, it seems that
the “family unit” will continue to be one of the building blocks of
society no matter what constitutes it.
Allowing the abrogation of the parental status would also not
lead to deterioration of family values. First, it would be reasonable
to believe that the legal abrogation of the parental status would
merely mirror the nature of the relationship in real life. The
essence of parenthood is the intimate relationship created and
maintained between a parent and a child. Thus, if there are
instances in which such a relationship never developed, or has
ceased to exist, a possible interpretation could conclude that
parenthood in such a case is meaningless and void since it does not
fulfill its purpose. Second, values and beliefs change over time.
Family values have changed a great deal during the last decades
and will most likely continue to change in the future. Allowing
legal abrogation of the parental bond would not be the cause for a
change in family values. In addition, it seems highly unlikely that
people in their multitudes will flow to the courts seeking to
terminate the parental bond. Ultimately, the fear of deterioration of
family values is merely political rhetoric that surfaces each time a
suggestion for modifying family law arises.
Another concern that critics may point to is the fear that some
will exploit the abrogation process in order to evade financial
responsibilities. The possibility to sever the parental bond could be
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exploited to renounce responsibility of a person towards his minor
child or towards his elderly parent who needs help and support. As
a consequence, the burden to support the person in need will fall
on the state and thus on society as a whole. Courts are already
concerned by the financial issues in termination of parental rights
cases.268 Those concerns should not be ignored or treated lightly.
The petition should prove to be authentic, should fulfill legal
requirements, and pass the scrutiny of the courts.
Many other rules and laws may be abused and exploited, yet
the solution cannot be their elimination. The legal requirements
and the discretion given to the courts serve as safeguards against
exploitation. However, legislators and courts should be careful not
to create a categorical rule barring the abrogation of parental status
every time the abrogation ends the financial support to the child
from that parent. Since a minor child is entitled to support from
both his or her parents, the child would obviously lose that support
from the parent with whom the severance occurs. Thus, creating a
categorical rule barring the abrogation of parental status every time
financial support comes up renders the process meaningless.
Rather, there should be a case-by-case examination. There could
be instances that would merit the abrogation of the parental status,
even if it means that the state will ultimately assume the financial
burden. The state should not force an intimate relationship and a
status entailing such a relationship on someone who does not want
it. Another optional response for the concern about the financial
support could be to condition the abrogation of parenthood on the
payment of a sum of money or on continued financial support of an
affixed amount. Yet, this solution should be applied on a case-by-
case basis. It should be applied with caution as to not make the
proceedings for abrogation redundant.
268 See In re Bruce R., 662 A.2d. 107, 117 (Conn. 1995); C.J.H. v. A.K.G.,
No. M2001-01234-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
9, 2002); In re Michael I.O., 551 N.W.2d. 855, 857 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1996).
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C. Proposals for Extending the Possibility to Sever the
Parent-Child Bond
This Article is not advocating for the abolishment of the
institution of parenthood. Nor is it arguing that the parent-child
relationship should end as soon as the child enters adulthood. This
Article only claims that there should be a way to terminate the
relationship, beyond the option ascribed by adoption laws, in the
exceptional cases that warrant it; a way that would be regulated by
the state with safeguards against exploitation. The suggestions
presented here for extending the possibility to sever the parent-
child status are not meant to be comprehensive, but rather serve to
facilitate discussion on these important legal issues.
The law should have provisions allowing the severance of the
parent-child status in situations that extend beyond adoption laws.
Those provisions should not be a part of adoption laws. Instead,
they should be enacted as part of the laws that define and establish
legal parenthood, and which ascribe the rights and responsibilities
conferred on parents regarding their children. The possibility to
sever the parental status should be regulated and governed by the
state. Either the parent or the child should be able to initiate the
procedure and petition the court to abrogate the parent-child status.
The procedure could be initiated during the child’s minority as
well as during the child’s adulthood, however different criteria
should be drafted for each phase of the child’s life taking into
account the child’s age, the actual maturity of the child, who
initiated the process, and the mental capacity of both the parent and
the child. A distinction should be made between the stage of
minority and the stage of adulthood.
When the child is an adult, deference should be given to both
the parents’ and child’s wishes and aspiration. The Supreme Court
of the United States has dictated that freedom of personal choice in
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.269 The ability to make one’s own
decisions regarding these fundamental matters is deeply rooted in
the American system. Thus, there should be a compelling reason
269 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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for not allowing two competent adults to decide to terminate their
parent-child relationship. One ought to also remember that the
child did not consent to enter this relationship in the first place.270
Therefore, when both the parent and the child wish to sever the
bond and they are both competent adults, their wish should, in
general, be granted. The meaning and permanence of the procedure
should be thoroughly explained to them by the court. When both
the parent and the child are competent adults and only one of them
wishes to sever the bond, they should first be directed to mediation
in order to try and solve their differences. If the mediation does not
bear fruits, the court should make its decision after ensuring that
the petition was authentic and was filed in good cause, and after
examining the justifications given by each side. Sometimes there
may also be a strong public or state interest that should be taken
into consideration as well.
When the petition involves a minor, a different consideration
ought to be made. The age of the minor child and his maturity
should be taken into account. A mature enough child should be
heard and his wishes should be taken into account. In such
proceedings, an attorney ad litem should be appointed to represent
the minor child. A distinction should be made between cases in
which the child has initiated the proceedings and cases where the
parent has filed the petition. When the child has filed the petition, a
careful examination should be made to ensure that the petition
reflects the child’s authentic will and not someone else’s, and that
the child understands the proceedings and the consequences.
Regardless of who initiated the proceedings, the best interest of
the child should prevail. Yet, it seems that sometimes courts
confuse the best interest of the child with the interests of the state.
Such appears to be the case in some of the instances the court
refused to grant termination of parental rights based on financial
considerations.271 When a parent is not a part of the child’s life and
the child does not recognize him as his or her parent, and the other
270 A presumption can be made maintaining that the parent wanted to bring
the child into the world. Yet, this assertion is not always true. In addition, even
in circumstances that the parent wanted to bring the child into the world, the
parent could not have known who the child will grow up to be and how their
relationship would turn out to be.
271 See sources cited and accompanying text, supra notes 163–67.
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parent consents to the petition, sometimes it would be in the best
interest of the child to sever the parental status. That is the case
especially if the other parent can support the child by him or
herself. However, even if the financial burden will fall partly on
the state, sometimes it would be in the best interest of the child to
abrogate the parental bond. I am not saying that financial
considerations should not be taken into account. Nonetheless, the
weight given to them should not override all other considerations.
Reviewing courts should have broad discretion to reach a
decision on a case-by-case basis, using the guidelines that would
be outlined by the legislature. Granting discretion to the courts to
decide on a case-by-case basis could disrupt legal certainty. Yet, in
family law in general,272 and all the more so in this kind of
sensitive matter, flexibility is very important. The law should not
give categorical answers to a given situation. Legislative
guidelines should include different parameters for courts to
consider. Interests of the state could play a part, as long as they do
not supersede other important considerations. The law must not be
afraid of creating a parental vacuum in cases that merit it. Special
consideration should be given to situations in which the child or
the parent is mentally incompetent and are lacking legal capacity
(not based on age). Particular criteria should be drafted to deal with
cases like this.
The consequence of granting a petition to abrogate the parental
status is a complete severance of the parent-child relationship and
bond. The severance is permanent, though the law should allow
revocation of the decree for a limited time and under certain
circumstances specified by law.
Autonomous individuals should have some control over their
intimate relationships by selecting with whom to form the
intimacy, by shaping the relationship, and by deciding when to end
it. The decision with whom to pursue an intimate relationship and
who to consider family reflects and shapes one’s identity. Thus, the
272 For example: Cases concerning children, such as custody cases and
child support, are decided on a case-by-case basis taking into account the facts
of the specific matter and the best interests of the children involved. “The Best
Interests of the Child” standard is a flexible one, that changes over time and is
often recruited by opposing sides at the same time. See Appleton, supra note
256, at 63–64.
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law should enable an individual to opt out of a parent-child
relationship that is unfulfilling, harmful, or that exists in the legal
sphere but not in real life. The provisions regarding the abrogation
of the parental bond should be part of the laws that define and
establish legal parenthood and should be regulated and governed
by the state. The possibility to petition for the abrogation of the
parental bond should be available to both the parent and the child.
The procedure could be initiated during the child’s minority as
well as during the child’s adulthood, albeit different criteria would
apply.
CONCLUSION
The matter in question, undeniably, should not be taken lightly.
The social convention that perceives parenthood as a status for life
is rooted and grounded so deep in our culture, that it seems that
challenging it would constitute the undermining of fundamental
perceptions in our society. Furthermore, there are concerns and
drawbacks that should be sorted out and resolved. Yet, that being
said, an option should be made possible for an individual to
terminate an undesirable relationship.
Family relationships play a very meaningful role in
individuals’ lives. Thus, access to family status-label and to its
expressive value is very important to people.273 This claim works
the other way around as well: since family relationships play a
crucial part in our lives, people aspire to have their family status
reflect their actual relationships and real-life experiences. Once
their family status indicates something that does not accurately
represent their life and emotional state, the disparity could be
unsettling.
There are instances in which it would be appropriate to allow a
parent to waive his parental status, or to allow a child to abrogate
the parental bond with the person considered his or her parent. The
law, by not administering a way to sever the bond, is “chaining”
the parent and the child together for life in an unbreakable knot.
273 Id. at 68 (stating regarding a court decision, that “the label ‘parent’
mattered, because the law makes such title important.”); Baker, supra note 7, at
132.
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The parent and the child do not have a say in the matter, though it
affects them their entire life and concerns one of the most intimate
and self-identifying relationships a person has in life. Hence,
exceptions to the rule of parenthood as a status for life should be
made, and a legal procedure for revoking the parental bond under
the regulation of the state should be established.
